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DELBERT OSGUTHORPE,
Appellant and Defendant.
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and HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN
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IN THE ,S,UPREME COURT
of the

STAT.E OF UTAH

JERRY MARCELLIN,
Respondent and Plaintiff,

-vs.-

Case No. 8944

DELBERT OSGUTHORPE,
Appellant and Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

FACTS OF THE CASE
This is an appeal frmn a judgment for $860.00 entered August 7, 1958, in favor of Jerry Marcellin, Respondent and Plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff, against Delbert Osguthorpe, Appellant and Defendant, hereinafter referred to as Defendant. The case arose
out of an automobile accident occurring November 17,
1957, in Summit 'County, Utah. The judgment represents
damage to Plaintiff's automobile.
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On the morning of the accident Plaintiff left his home
at Park City, Utah, for work at Chicago Bridge & Iron
Works, Salt Lake City, Utah, at his customary timebetween ten and five minutes before 6:00 A.M. (T. 3.
References are to transcript and record, since the two
are separate.) Plaintiff was driving a 1954 Chevrolet
automobile in good working condition, equipped with new
snow tires. It was dark. The road had an inch or two of
new snow over ice; it was "very slick". (T. 4, 28, 47).
After leaving Park City, Plaintiff traveled north
along U.S. Alternate Highway 40 to a point west of
Snyderville, Utah, where the highway curves, turned
left at the curve and proceeded \vest, downgrade, at 35
to 40 miles per hour. He saw the headlights of another
vehicle about 1,000 feet straight ahead in the lane for oncoming cars. They were on high beam. ( T. 5, 6).
When 500 to 600 feet from the vehicle ahead, Plaintiff began blinking his lights. vVhen 200 to 250 feet away,
he concluded that the other vehicle was not going to dim
its lights and eased off the accelerator, reducing his
speed, possibly five miles per hour, but nevertheless continued until his headlights disclosed the red taillights of a
Cadillac automobile 50 to 60 feet away stopped on a
northwesterly angle blocking his lane of traffic. (T. 7, 8).
Defendant, 1neanwhile, had driven a pick-up truck
from his dair~T fann located on the south side of the highway onto the higlnnt~T, turned right and proceeded east
when observed the Cadillac autonwbile apparently dis-
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abled (T. 62). He stopped even with the Cadillac to see
if he could be of assistance. At this time he observed the
headlights of Plaintiff's automobile approaching at a
high rate of speed (T. 69). Defendant started backing
toward the shoulder and to the west and had backed 27
feet when Plaintiff's automobile richocheted from the
rear bumper of the Cadillac into the front fender of the
truck, the left side of which was 4 to 5 feet from the center
of the highway, and continued through snow banks on
the side of the road for a distance of 216 feet (T. 49, 57,
59). Defendant's truck was moved 2 or 3 feet by the int-pact (T. 30). The highway at the scene of the accident
was 19 or 20 feet wide (T. 5).
Plaintiff admitted that his headlights would disclose
objects 250 feet away, that he saw the Cadillac automobile as soon as his headlights fell upon it, but that he was
unable to stop because he was going too fast. (T. 27, 32).
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court, over
objection of the Defendant, submitted the case to the jury
upon a special verdict containing the doctrine of Last
Clear Chance, in addition to the issues of negligence,
contributory negligence and proximate cause. In this
connection, the jury was instructed :
"Under certain circumstances a plaintiff is entitled to judgment against a defendant even though
the plaintiff be guilty of contributory negligence.
This rule of law that thus permits a negligent
plaintiff to recover judg1nent is known as the
doctrine of last clear chance. If you determine
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that the plaintiff was in fact guilty of contributory
negligence, you should then consider whether or
not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable
to this case. The doctrine is applicable if and only
if you find from a preponderence of the evidence
that each of the following five propositions is true:
1. That the plaintiff was in a position of
danger from which he was unable to free himself
by the exercise of due care.
2. That the defendant either discovered the
plaintiff in his helpless position of danger, or by
exercising due care would have discovered him.
3. That the defendant, after thus discovering
the plaintiff, or after he thus should have discovered him had he exercised due care, then realized,
or by exercising due care should have realized th~~
danger to the plaintiff.
4. That at the time the defendant thus either
discovered the plaintiff or should have discovered
him, and after he thus realized or should have
realized the plaintiff's helpless position of danger,
he then had a clear opportunity to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care and ''ith
his then existing abilit~~. There 1nust have been an
actual opportunity existing at that 11101nent for
the defendant to avoid the accident. Also. it n1ust
have been a fair, clear opportunity and not just
a bare possibility of doing so.
5. That the defendant then negligently failed
to avail hin1self of that clear opportunity and as a
proximate r0~nlt, the plaintiff \YH$ injured.
If ~·ou find that each of the above five propo8itions is tnw, the doctrine of last clear chance
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is applicable to this case, and the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict in his favor even though you
find him guilty of contributory negligence. If you
find that any one of the above five proposition~
is not true, the doctrine of last clear chance has
no application and cannot be invoked by the plaintiff."
The jury found the Defendant guilty of violating the
statute relative to dimming headlights, 41-6-135, U.C.A.,
1953, and that this violation was a proximate cause of the
collision (R. 74). The jury also found: "The Plaintiff was
contributorily negligent in travelling too fast for existing conditions," but that: "The Defendant had the last
clear chance as defined in the instructions to avoid the
collision" (R. 75, 76).
After the verdict had been received, both Plaintiff
and Defendant moved for judgment in their favor upon
the verdict (R. 79). Plainitff's motion was granted and
Defendant's motion denied (R. 92). Judgment was thereupon entered for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant,
from which this appeal was taken.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I

THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH,
ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR
CHANCE TO THE JURY IN THIS CASE.
II

THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY ERRED
IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
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UPON THE SPECIAL VERDICT AND IN REFUSING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT UPON
THE SPECIAL VERDICT.

ARGUMENT
I

THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH,
ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR
CHAN.CE TO THE JURY IN THIS CASE.

The doctrine of Last Clear Chance as it applied in
Utah is based largely upon proximate cause. If plaintiff's
negligence continues up to the time of the injury and is
a proximate cause thereof, Last Clear Chance is not
applicable. This Court has firmly established this proposition and has repeatedly held that in cases where the
plaintiff's negligence continues, Last Clear Chance is not
to be considered but rather the usual rules of contributory
negligence apply and if found defeat the plaintiff's claim.
In Compton et al. v. Ogden Union Railzcay and Depot
Company, (Utah, 1951), 235 P. 2d 515, the plaintiff, w·hile
walking along a well defined pathway running parallel to
the defendant's railroad tracks, ·was struck by a diesel
engine operated by the defendant in its yard at Ogden,
Utah. The Court said :
". . . When the injured person's negligence
has not emue to rest so that by the exercise of
reasonable care she "\Yould have been able to aYoid
the peril at any tilne up to the nwrnent of injury,
the injnr)· is then the result of the concurring
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negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant. The
one was just as nmch the proxirnate cause as tho
other."
See also Holmgren v. Uni'on Pacific R. Co., (Utah,
1948), 198 P.2d 459, where the court pointed out that in
Last Clear Chance cases the plaintiff's negligence has
become in a sense fixed and realizable and on to this state
of things the defendant approaches onto the negligent
plaimt~ff with and in control of the danger. (Emphasis
added.)
In this case the jury has found that the negligence
of Plaintiff was a concurring cause of the accident. This
negligence consisted of failing to drive at a reasonable
speed in view of the width, surface and condition of the
highway, the traffic thereon, the visibility and the actual
and potential hazards then existing (Instruction 9-E). In
its very nature, this negligence continued until the moment of the accident.
Even if it be assurned, however, that Plaintiff's negligence came to rest or became fixed, what opportunity did
Defendant have to avoid the accident~ Plaintiff argues
that Defendant could have dimmed his lights and this
accident thereby avoided.
This obviously would have required that Plaintiff
guide his car like a sled between the Cadillac and the truck
along a "weaving" course. Last Clear Chance, however,
conten1plates that Defendant, not Plaintiff, have the
clear chance.
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This is well stated in Graham v. J ohnson7 et al. 7
(Utah, 1946), 166 P.2d 230, where the court said:
"The liability of the defendant arose because
he failed to take the opportunity which he alone
had timely to avoid doing the plaintiff harm even
though the plaintiff was negligent in getting hinlself in a position where he was helpless or because
he was so inattentive that he was not alert to the
approaching danger over which defendant had
control." (Emphasis added.)

* * *
"One should not be held liable for failing to
avoid the effect of the other's negligence in a
situation where it is speculative as to whether he
was afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. In
a situation where both parties are on the 1nove
the significance of the word 'clear' is most important. Otherwise we may put the onus of avoiding the effect of one's negligence on a party not
negligent. That party's negligence only arise.:~
when it is definitely established that there was
ample time and opportunity to avoid the accident
which was not taken advantage of."
Last Clear Chance cannot be applied on a sho-wing
that Defendant may have had a chance to avoid the accident. "Defendant n1ust have had the last chance and also
had a clear chance." Holmgren v. Union Pacific R. Co._,
supra. As the court observed in that case that he should
have had the last chance implies that his chance to avoid
the accident 1nust have cmne later in point of time than
any similar ehance on the part of the injured person.
That he should have had a clear chance iinplies that he
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must have had nwre than a bare possible chance to avoid
an unexpected peril created practically siinultaneously
with the happening of the accident by the negligence of
the injured party.
In spite of this well settled principle, Plaintiff asks
that this Court now hold that it is sufficient for application of Last Clear Chance that Plaintiff be able to avoid
the accident but for the negligence of Defendant.
Even if so, how could Plaintiff have avoided the accident if he was in a position of inextricable peril as he
Inust be to invoke the doctrine in the first instance o?
It is a contradiction in tenns to say while Plaintiff
could not extricate himself from the roller coaster ride
upon which he had embarked, nevertheless, he could have
at once freed himself had Defendant's lights been dimmed.

The "dimming" cases are governed by principles of
primary negligence and contributory negligence and
where a blinded plaintiff has been found negligent, such
negligence has been held a concurring cause of the accident. See "Duties and Liabilities of Vehicle Driver Blinded by the Glare of Lights," 22 A.L.R. (2d) 292 and "Glaring Headlights as Cause of Collisions," 9 N.C.C.A. (3rd)
190.
The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is a limitation upon the defense of contributory negligence and should not
be extended further in its application than it can be supported by cogent reasoning. Anderson v. Bingham Indus-
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trial Railroad Company (Utah, 1950), 214 P.2d 607. This
Court has repeatedly held that Last Clear Chance has
limited application to cases involving moving vehicles.
Hickok v. Skinner, (Utah, 1948), 190 P.2d 514; Beckstrom
v. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 P.2d 309 (1955). Also,
in this case Defendant was moving away from Plaintiff.
It would, indeed, make more sense to apply the doctrine
against Plaintiff than in his favor.
II

THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY ERRED
IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
UPON THE SPECIAL VERDICT AND IN REFUSING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT UPON
THE SPECIAL VERDICT.

Since the doctrine of Last Clear Chance can have no
proper application to this case, the finding of the jury
that the Plaintiff was "contributorily negligent," defined
in Instruction 9-a as negligence on the part of a person
injured which cooperating with the negligence of another,
assists in proxin1ately causing his own injury, it must
follow that Defendant's motion for judgment, no cause of
action, upon the verdict should have been granted.
CONCLUSION
If the doctrine of Last Clear Chance be dee1ned applicable to the facts of this case, then the defense of contributory negligence is mnasculated.
The jury in this case found contributory negligence
in driving too fast for existing conditions, which, in its
very nature, continued to the Ino1nent of the accident.
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Since Last Clear Chance can have no proper application
under such facts, the District Court of Summit County
should have entered judgment for the Defendant, no cause
of action, upon the Defendant's motion following return
of the special verdict. The District Court's error in failing so to do should now be corrected by this Court by
reversal of the judgment on the special verdict with instructions to the clerk of the court to enter judgment for
the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, no cause of action.
Respectfully subrnitted,
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
and HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Appellant and Defendant
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